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Resumo
Os requisitos crescentes dos serviços em nuvem de hoje requerem a evolução da infraestrutura de rede
para suportar a quantidade crescente de dados que são processados todos os dias. Isso significa que os
operadores de centros de dados devem projectar ou adaptar os seus ambientes de rede em nuvem para
fornecer uma conexão estável e confiável. Uma infraestrutura otimizada muitas vezes significa também
a redução de custos na utilização dos sistemas e nos gastos em energia.
À medida que as redes crescem e são mais complexas, os sistemas devem ser implementados de
forma a permitir não só acompanhar de perto os recursos que a compõem mas também permitindo uma
certa liberdade para a possível evolução dos requisitos. Como tal, as soluções típicas dos fornecedores
não se encaixam realmente nessa paisagem de constante mudança, uma vez que apresentam soluções
muito sólidas e verticalmente integradas. O paradigma do Software Defined Networking, no entanto,
é capaz de resolver esse problema, pois permite o controlo centralizado das redes subjacentes, propor-
cionando visibilidade e controlo sobre os dispositivos, simplificando o diagnóstico de erros e proporcio-
nando uma maior capacidade de resposta.
Neste trabalho, propomos um sistema de gerenciamento modular para controladores de Software
Defined Networks dos centros de dados da nuvem, fornecendo aos administradores de sistemas uma
plataforma simples, destacando-se e ressaltando a visualização da topologia de rede e monitorização
das portas dos dispositivos. A modularidade também fornece uma plataforma simples para estender a
funcionalidade dos controladores de rede, que podem ser usados para implementar a detecção de anor-
malidades e optimizar os caminhos de encaminhamento de fluxo, entre outros.
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Abstract
The rising requirements of today’s cloud services require the evolution of networking infrastructure to
support the increasing amount of data that is processed every day. This means that data center network
operators must design or adapt their cloud networking environments to provide a stable and reliable
connection. Better optimized infrastructure often also means cost reductions in network utilization and
energy savings.
As networks grow larger and more complex, systems must be put in place that allow for closely
monitoring the resources that make up the network, while also allowing for a certain freedom for the
possible constant change of the network. As such, typical vendor solutions don’t really fit into this
ever changing landscape, since they present very solid and vertically integrated solutions. The Software
Defined Networking paradigm, however, is able to solve this issue, since it enables the centralized control
of the underlying networks, providing visibility and control over the network’s devices, simplifying error
diagnosis and troubleshooting.
In this work we propose a modular management system for cloud data center Software Defined Net-
working controllers, providing system administrators a simple platform to view their network’s topology,
monitor networking devices ports, etc. The modularity also provides a simple platform to extend the
functionality of the networking controllers, that can be used to implement detection of network abnor-
malities and optimize flow forwarding paths, among others.
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“By the time you’ve sorted out a complicated idea
into little steps that even a stupid machine can deal with,
youve certainly learned something about it yourself.
Douglas Adams
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Introduction
1.1 Context
The rapid expansion of the cloud computing environment in the previous decade is related to the in-
creasing demand in computational power that applications like distributed databases or data analysis
have. Public cloud solutions like Amazon’s Web Services, Microsoft’s Azure, or private solutions of-
fered through OpenStack provide a very large pool of resources for developers to deploy applications
with ease. Through economies of scale, these vendors have centralized their solutions in very large scale
data centers, consolidating their operations in a single location, allowing increased performance of appli-
cations, and easier maintenance. The offer of virtualisation solutions also contributes to the recent surge
in popularity of these systems, due to the less spending in operational costs and improved utilization
of hardware [1]. Subscription based systems are typically available for renting, allowing users to use
services on a Virtual Machine.
Using open source applications and whitebox hardware has also contributed to the success of these
environments, due to the possible cost reductions. Software Defined Networking (SDN), has proven to
be a reliable environment to manage data center environments, due to the centralization of the network
controllers, improved programmability of the network’s data plane, and improved management systems.
Network programmability, despite not being exclusive to the SDN framework, eliminates the effort in
individually configuring every network device, which in large scale environments becomes an impossible
task. This model also provides the network engineers and software developers a high level network
abstraction that is used to monitor network utilization and optimize resource utilization.
Network management systems (NMSs) provide the central architectural component that allows the
system administrators to track the systems utilization, analyse link, node and device failures, and observe
alarms when the networks’ state is outside the range that network operators define as normal. These
systems also provide an insight for network operators to research where resources should be allocated.
However, network planning considering virtualisation deployments is considered a difficult task, due to
complex scheduling policies and performance deviations [2].
The topic of traffic engineering in SDN is central to this field, more specifically, the flow and ap-
plication level monitoring. The possibility of acting differently towards network traffic is an advantage
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for network operators, allowing to prioritize applications that are sensitive to latency, like video and au-
dio streaming. As such, focus on service prioritization and delivery optimization has been the focus of
research of the past few years [3].
1.2 Motivation
The increased relevance that cloud computing solutions have on today’s networking environments, and
the growing opportunities in data centers, mainly kick-started by the prevalence of OpenStack, have
brought a rising demand of open sourced solutions that provide an interface in these environments. Ex-
posing a programmable interface for managing networking devices is a central function of network con-
trollers. Due to the prevalence of Linux-based environments in these data centers, network administra-
tors’ familiarity with the Linux networking stack provides a possible interface for network management.
With this consideration, BISDN developed Basebox, an open source Software-Defined Network con-
troller that interacts between the Linux kernel’s networking library and networking devices. This pro-
vides a familiar and stable Application Programming Interface to configure ports, Virtual Local Area
Network (VLAN) and routes, and the advantages of using tools like systemd-networkd and iptables.
Despite providing a stable platform, Basebox also provides a
1.3 Aims and objectives
This thesis aims to plan and develop a system that exposes the physical topology of connections between
switches and server, and monitoring the port configuration and statistics. This management system aims
to clearly display changes in configuration and behaviour of the networking infrastructure connected
to a SDN controller, which will allow system operators to maintain finer control over their resources.
In this first part, we aim to define the components to implement this management system, from the
necessary modifications to the existing controllers, to the Graphical User Interface that users will interact
with. Typical management solutions like Icinga 1, Zabbix 2 or Graphana 3 display relevant metrics for
monitoring of network devices, including the display of the physical topology, monitor the port status,
display devices temperature, among others. In this stage, we define the Minimum Viable Product (MVP)
for this system as a simple Graphical User Interface that can display the connections between switches
and servers, and expose port statistics like the number of received packets and bytes and the number of
errors.
We propose an Operations Support System (OSS) that interacts with the controllers and implements
intelligence for monitoring the state of the network. Due to data center’s traffic profile, one common
challenge for optimizing the networks resource utilization is the asymmetry of traffic, where most of the
networking flows are short-lived, latency-sensitive quick bursts of packets, but do not amount for the
1https://www.icinga.com/
2https://www.zabbix.com/
3https://grafana.com/
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total traffic in the network. The main contributor for the total traffic volume are the large and long-lived
flows, usually called elephant flows. Solution to this problem will increase the networks capability of
splitting resources between the multiple competing virtualised applications, and, as a consequence, their
associated flows. Furthermore, by maintaining a system that monitors and alarms network operators of
the occurrences of large data streams, this will provide insight to the network operators to plan ahead
their network resources. To implement this functionality, we researched the most common ways that
detection of network traffic changes are done, and propose an algorithm that enables quick detection of
changes in the network traffic behaviour via simple statistical methods.
1.4 Organization
This dissertation is divided in the following chapters:
 Background begins with an overview of Software-Defined Networking, providing an insight on
the protocol behind these environments, and presenting information on the existing applications.
We also give an overview of network management, and approach what the roles of management
systems are in current data centers.
 Related Work explores the deeper concepts of statistical detection, providing a formal framework
for change detection mechanisms. We approach the techniques traditionally used in change de-
tection mechanisms, and evaluate the performance measures used to assess their efficiency. We
also explore further the concept of elephant flows, exploring a possible mathematical represen-
tation, and present the mechanisms typically used for detection and mitigation of this network
phenomenon.
 Monitoring SDN Switches is a chapter dedicated to defining the proposed architecture for this
thesis, by defining the components and the high level approaches for implementing this solution,
providing a description on the architecture of the system this thesis will integrate.
 Management API approaches the first stage of the developed work. First, we design the network-
ing entities with a set of standardized data models for networks, so that the structure for creating
the management interface is logically organized. Then we explore the researched alternatives for
implementing the transport protocol between the network controllers and the Graphical User In-
terface. Finally we demonstrate the final Graphical User Interface developed for this stage.
 Elephant Flow Monitoring is the final chapter, where we explore the proposed solution for the
OSS, more specifically the part related to the elephant flow monitoring. In this chapter we explore
the design of the algorithm for monitoring the port changes, using the statistical methods presented
in the Related Work chapter. Finally, we present the results of the detection algorithm, and propose
a set of optimizations for use in this part.
3
Background
2.1 Network Management
The topic of network management is very extensive, due to the many components that make up today’s
networks, and the vast amount of information that they provide. It can be summed up as the operation
and maintenance of network infrastructure so that the service it provides is not only "healthy", but also
is operated at a level that keeps costs down for service providers.
2.1.1 Requirements for management systems
As the complexity of the networks, and network devices that compose them, grows bigger and bigger,
the management systems should accommodate for the their necessities. As such, the basic groups of
requirements for management functions defined in the ITU-T X 700 Recommendation [22] are:
 Fault management is the capability for detection, isolation and correction of abnormal operations
in the system
 Accounting management provides ways to monitor the system resource utilization, and using this
data to generate information about the costs that the operation of a certain resource will incur. This
allows for optimizing the network utilization of resources, as it provides insights on how to plan
the evolution of the network
 Configuration management is related to the maintenance and updates of hardware and software
in the network, and the general setup of devices that allow to start, maintain and terminate services
 Performance management relates to monitor systems for the traffic utilization, response time,
performance and logging histories. This allows to maintain Service Level Agreements (SLA)
between the service provider and the client, providing better services even in cases of unusual
traffic.
 Security management enables setting up security policies in terms of access control to resources,
private information protection, among others.
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A network management system usually consists of a centralized station, and management agents
running on the network devices. Using management protocols, the agents can report to the station infor-
mation about the its operational status, which includes information ranging from CPU load to bandwidth
usage. Typically this information can be retrieved by the controller polling the agents, or the agents send-
ing information on their own, usually to inform of status changes. Using this information, the network
operator can get insight on the performance or possible errors of the devices that are monitored. In the
next section, we explore one of the most popular management protocols, SNMP.
2.1.2 SNMP
The Simple Network Management Protocol is an IETF defined protocol that allows for the interconnec-
tion of networking devices, and provide a structured way to retrieve relevant information about these
devices. As the name suggests, SNMP allows for a simplified approach to network monitoring, since it
reduces the complexity of the functions that the management agent needs to comply with, which bring
several advantages, like reducing the costs for development of management tools; providing a way to
monitor, independently from different hardware providers the resources; and also supporting freedom in
extending the protocol in order to include other aspects of network operation [23].
The architectural model of SNMP can be described in figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Architectural components of SNMP
The management database is one of the most important components of this system, because it serves
as a reference to the entities that are managed in the SNMP protocol. The formal name for this database
is the MIB - Management Information Base [24], and its composed of a collection of objects.
Each object has a name, syntax and encoding [25]. The name of the object, more specifically, the
Object Identifier (OID), is a reference to the object itself. This name is usually a list of integers, and they
serve to build a tree-like hierarchy. This structure allows for the organization of all objects in a logical
pattern, as there is a parent node that contains references to their children, which provides different
indexes for different objects. For human readability, there is usually an Object Descriptor, to refer to the
object type.
The syntax defines the type of data structure in the object type; and the encoding describes how the
object type is transmitted on the network. In the context of this thesis, an important group is the interfaces
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group, as it exposes information about the interfaces present in a system. Its OID is .3.6.1.2.1.2., and it
contains the number of interfaces in a system, and a table containing the counters related to the interface
status, like the received unicast packets, the physical address, among others. The flexibility of the MIB
allows for vendors to introduce their own databases into the MIB, while also remaining compatible with
the standardized one.
Due to its permanence in the market, the protocol has suffered some large changes since its original
design. SNMPv3 now supports important changes to the original one, most notably in the security
aspects, introducing strong authentication and encryption capabilities.
Despite it’s dominance on network management products, SNMP features some bad characteristics
that pose an obstacle for the widespread use in network configuration and management, like [26]:
 Incompleteness of the devices features
 SNMP access can sometimes crash systems, or return wrong data
 Unavailability of MIB modules, which forces users to use CLI’s
 Poor performance
 Security is difficult to handle
2.1.3 Data Center Networks (DCN)
The design of the network architecture is central to the data-center networks, as the placement for physi-
cal hosts and virtual machines allows for sharing the resources and create a logical hierarchy of network
devices. The study of the design of DCN has resulted in the creation of typical DC topologies, like fat-tree
topologies (as seen in 2.2), or others, including de Bruijn server only networks, or BCube switch heavy
networks [27]. Using these standardized architectures monitoring the traffic characteristics, resource
consumption and costs of the networking devices are easier, and causes for failure of are understood and
mitigated, and the entire DC can run on the most optimal way possible. The organization in the DCN
also allows for traffic in the network being resistant to failure scenarios, since multiple paths can be used,
redirecting packets to the correct destination even if a link to a switch fails.
Figure 2.2: Visual representation of the fat tree topology commonly used in data centers
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2.2 Software Defined Networking
Computer networking is a vital part of the services that are offered today, and, as such, the performance
in technology backing these is central to the quality of these services. As the service providers move
their data centers to cloud computing environments, enabling several improvements in the predictability,
Quality of Service and ease of use of their services, new technologies are required to make sure that their
services are adapted to the fast changing landscape of networking. One of the most notable innovations
in this field is called Software Defined Networking, where, as described by the Open Networking
Foundation, the control and data planes are decoupled, network intelligence and state are logically
centralized, and the underlying network infrastructure is abstracted from the applications [4]. The two
main contributions of this architecture are:
 Separation of data and control planes SDN allows for the separation of the network control
plane from the data forwarding plane by having network "intelligence" present in the network
controllers, and having them control the forwarding elements that live in the Data Plane
 Centralization of network management functions By isolating the management on a separate
plane, there is possibility of developing a single controller that can regulate the entire network,
having unrestricted access to every element present in the network, simplifying management, mon-
itoring, application of QoS policies, flow optimization, etc
This new paradigm introduces programmability in the configuration and management of networks,
by consolidating the control of network devices to a single central controller, achieving separation of
the control and the data plane, and supporting a more dynamic and flexible infrastructure. This concept
removes middleboxes 1 replacing them with generic software applications.
(a) Traditional networking architecture (b) SDN architecture
Figure 2.3: Traditional vs SDN network architecture
1Computer networking device that does some operations on traffic, besides packet forwarding. Examples include caches,
Intrusion Detection System (IDS), Network Address Translation (NAT), etc
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By moving network infrastructure to SDN models, the difficulty of managing a network is greatly
reduced, since the logical centralization of the control layer exposes the global view of the network, sim-
plifying management tasks. Furthermore, this also removes the challenge of configure each networking
device individually, turning network operation and management into setting high level policies in the
controllers, and letting the protocols that handle connection between the devices and controllers set the
actual rules.
Software-Defined Networking is defined as being composed of two layers: Northbound Interfaces,
which are composed of Application Programming Interfaces (API) for communication between applica-
tions and the controller, enabling network services like routing, security, visualization and management;
and the Southbound Interfaces which connect the network devices to the controllers via protocols like
OpenFlow (see section 2.2.1), or P4 2.
Figure 2.4: General overview of the SDN architectural components
Understanding SDN platforms is then composed of understanding the operation of both interfaces,
and defining requirements for their operation, which are listed below [5]. These requirements are general
principles for networks, but the addition of the SDN controller introduces a single point of failure, that
could be damaging to the entire network.
1. High Performance
2. High Availability
3. Fault Tolerance
4. Monitoring
5. Programmability
6. Modularity
7. Security
2https://p4.org/
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2.2.1 OpenFlow
With the growth of the networking infrastructure of the past few decades, the need for an environment that
allows for experimentation and testing of different protocols and equipment became evident. As such,
there was need for a framework that could enable testing of new ideas on close to realistic settings. So, on
February 2011 OpenFlow was released, and this proposal quickly became the standard for networking
in a Software Defined Network. Since 2011, this protocol has suffered some revisions, and the latest
version released is version 1.5.1.
Several reasons led to the quick standardization of this protocol, which are related not only to the
initial requirements of the platform, like the capability of supporting high-performance and low-cost
implementations, but also the extensibility that the open source development model provides, removing
the limitations that typical commercial solutions give the network researchers.
The big advantage of OpenFlow is that it is, from the data forwarding point of view, easy to process,
since the control decisions are made by the controller present in a separate plane, and all the switch needs
to do is correctly match the incoming packets, forwarding them according to the rules established by the
controller. The components that are part of this system and enable this functionality are:
 Flow Tables This element describes the main component of the switching capabilities of the Open-
Flow switch. Inside the switch there are several flow tables that contain rules to match incoming
packets, and process them according to the rules specified by the controller. These rules can con-
tain actions that affect the path of the packets, and these actions usually include forwarding to a
port, packet modification, among others. Classification is done via matching one or more fields
present in the packet, for example the switch input port, the MAC and IP addresses, IP protocol.
The required actions for an OpenFlow switch are the capability of forwarding to a set of output
ports, allowing the packet to move across the network; to send them to the controller, in the case
of a miss of match; and finally the ability to drop packets, which is useful for DDoS mitigation, or
other security concerns.
 OpenFlow Protocol The OpenFlow Protocol between the switch and the controller defines several
messages that allow for the control of the switch. This protocol enables capabilities such as re-
questing the available features on the switch, configuration of flow rules, among others, using the
messages referred to as Controller-to-Switch. Other relevant message types are the Asynchronous
messages, that provide notifications of events that occurred. This type includes the PACKET_IN
message, which is a type of message that is sent to the controller when a certain packet has no
match in the flow tables present in the switch. Finally, the Symmetric message, like the Hello
message, which are used for negotation of the OpenFlow version and other elements to help con-
nection setup. The initial connection is initialized by either the switch or the controllers over the
defined transport protocol, but after the transport connection is established, the OpenFlow channel
should behave the same way [6].
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 Secure Channel OpenFlow defines the channel that is between the switch and the controller as a
secure communications channel. As messages that are exchanged between the switches and the
controllers are critical for the correct operation of the system, the channel should be cryptograph-
ically secure, to prevent spoofing and manipulation of this information. As such, the channel is
usually transported over TLS.
Figure 2.5: Images describing OpenFlow components. On the left, an overview to the entire system, and
on the right a view at the table structure of the OpenFlow Switch [6]
Figure 2.5 describes the OpenFlow components. The image on the left shows the entire pipeline and
the connections between the controllers and switch, but lacks the connection of the OpenFlow switch to
the data plane switch ports. In image on the right, the structure of the Flow Table is summarized, and the
packet in originates from the switches’ ingress port, and after processing, the packet will exit through the
switches’ egress port.
In the case of controller failover, then the backup controllers should act on this failure, and act as the
new master. OF switches should connect to the set of available controllers, which should coordinate the
management of the switch amongst themselves, according to a set of certain roles. After the switches’
first connection to the controllers, they should maintain these connections alive, but the controllers have
the possibility of changing their roles. These roles are as follows:
 OFPCD_ROLE_EQUAL, where the controller has full access to the switch, receiving all incom-
ing messages, and can modify the state of the switch
 OFPCD_ROLE_MASTER, which is a similar status to the previous one, but where the switch
ensures that only one switch is connected as the master role
 OFPCD_ROLE_SLAVE is a role that controllers has read-only access to the switch, having no
permissions for altering the state of the switch. The only message that controllers registered with
this role receive are the port-status messages
The OpenFlow switches maintain a set of counters, similar to SNMP, that provide information about
the state of the ports, group, flow and table stats. The statistics that are exposed from OF are shown in
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table 2.1. In this table, the fields duration_sec and duration_nsec specify the time that each port has been
configured, in seconds and nanoseconds respectively.
Table 2.1: OpenFlow port statistics
uint64_t rx_packets uint64_t tx_packets;
uint64_t rx_bytes; uint64_t tx_bytes;
uint64_t rx_bytes; uint64_t tx_dropped;
uint64_t rx_errors; uint64_t tx_errors;
uint64_t rx_frame_err; uint64_t tx_over_err;
uint64_t rx_crc_err;
uint64_t collisions;
uint32_t duration_sec;
uint32_t duration_nsec;
2.2.1.1 OpenFlow Data-Path Abstraction
Figure 2.6: OF-DPA components [7]
OpenFlow Data-Path Abstraction (OF-DPA) allows development of OpenFlow based SDN applications
based in Broadcom’s hardware switches. It provides a hardware abstraction layer, supporting program-
ming of network devices using OpenFlow. The main difference from pure OpenFlow to Broadcom’s
implementation are the Flow Table structures, known as the Table Type Patterns (TTP). These TTPs
are templates that describe the protocol features and messages that the controllers and switches need to
support, providing developers additional structure for easier implementation of their applications. Fur-
thermore, the specialized structure provided by these patterns allow for optimizing the allocation of table
memory, and improve the lookup algorithms.
Figure 2.7 displays the utilized TTP in OF-DPA.
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Figure 2.7: OF-DPA TTP [7]
2.2.2 Network Devices
Networking devices are a central part of network operation, performing routing, switching, management
operations, and span the different layers of the OSI model. The investment in dedicated hardware to per-
form management functions can potentially be replaced by SDN controllers, offloading the QoS policies
and traffic engineering (TE) functions from hardware to software. As such, in this section we focus on
the devices that are responsible for the operation on layers 2 and 3 of the standardized networking stack,
switches and routers. A networking switch is a device that connects multiple devices on a computer net-
work, using hardware addresses (MAC) to forward data inside the network, by mapping each port with
a one (or more) MAC addresses, while a router is responsible of forwarding packets between different
computer networks. These devices run at different layers of the networking stack, the former operating
at the data-link, or layer 2, and the latter operating at layer 3, or network. This is not a clear separation
however with multilayer devices, where switches also provide routing capabilities. Typical vendors for
these solutions include Cisco and Juniper, but the rise of whitebox switches that have support for deploy-
ments in SDN environments enables network operators to avoid vendor lock-in, and take advantage of
the open nature of these devices. Commonly associated with whitebox switches is the support for the
OpenFlow protocol, making these an essential part of the SDN infrastructures.
The performance 3 of networking devices is central to the proper operation of networks, especially
in deployments in Data Centers, where the interfaces must be able to support 100 Gbps links and fur-
ther, while also maintaining the programmability that is expected of SDN based infrastructures. This
performance is linked with the hardware that is chosen to serve as the base for the devices [8]:
3Defined as the throughput and latency of the network node
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1. General Purpose Processors (GPPs) provide the greatest flexibility of all the solutions, while
providing the worst results in performance, due to the general purpose design of the hardware and
the optimizations present in the other architectures.
2. Field-Programmable gate arrays (FPGA) are a platform that enables the configuration of the
devices via hardware design tools, maintaining the programmability of the GPPs, while also al-
lowing for designing the devices around the tasks that they perform, including optimizations for
switching/ routing. A notable example of platforms based in these systems is NetFPGA 4, an open
source hardware platform designed for research, and supporting up to 100 Gbps operation.
3. Application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC) are integrated circuits that are customized for
one particular application, removing the programmability, but also providing greater performance
than the former options.
These architectures generally allows us to design SDN architectures around general purpose hard-
ware, contributing to the flexibility of this paradigm, even considering the proprietary nature of the
ASICs, which can be bundled with Software Development Kits (SDKs) for developing other applica-
tions on top of these.
Considering OF enabled hardware switches, the processing of incoming packets is done as by match-
ing a (up to) 15 field tuple [9] to several flow tables, that have rules sent from the controller. In these
cases, the possibility of bottlenecks is due to several factors, including the latency of the installation of
new flow rules, and the memory limitation on the hardware. Solutions to the memory limitations in OF
switches include DevoFlow [10], which utilizes wild card rules to reduce the number of flow entries
that are installed on the devices, while also aggregating traffic, simplifying detection and management
of unexpected large volumes of traffic (see section 3.1.2), due to reduced control plane load; and Smart-
Time [11] manages the timeouts for the rules on the switch, reducing this in the presence of micro flows,
and increasing the timeout in the case of the occurrence of longer lived flows, which improves memory
utilization and reduces the load on the controller.
Virtualised environments also allowed the development of Software Switches, due to the highly dy-
namic nature of virtual environments with frequent network topology changes caused by Virtual Ma-
chine (VM) movement between physical hosts. Furthermore, standard Linux bridges cannot handle the
multi-server deployments 5 used in virtualised environments, which is why software switches like Open
vSwitch (OVS) replace traditional switches in multi-server virtual deployements. OVS switches are also
compliant with the OpenFlow protocol, which shows the flexibility that can be achieved by combining
all the networking devices with one management protocol.
4https://netfpga.org/site/#/
5https://github.com/openvswitch/ovs/blob/master/Documentation/intro/why-ovs.rst
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2.2.3 SDN Controllers
Central for operation of the networks, SDN controllers allow the orchestration of the multiple parts
required for correctly operating a large scale network. Separate from the data traffic on the network, these
are responsible for the interaction between the Northbound networking applications and the Southbound
devices, as described in figure 2.8.
Figure 2.8: SDN Interfaces division
Although the use case of the controllers will depend on each deployment and implementation, the
basic use case is to provide connectivity across layer 2 and 3 networks, which is achieved via flow man-
agement, including operations like switching, forwarding and potentially load balancing. The logically
centralized position augments this capability by keeping the state of the entire network, which facilitates
route planning and management.
Despite the advantages that the controllers centralization provides, this also introduces a Single Point
of Failure (SPOF) [12], exposing a weakness to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and controller failure.
The potential catastrophic scenario related to controller downtime due to these failures means that an
approach must be planned for disaster failure and recovery. High Availability setups are used to mitigate
the potential failure of the controllers, by having multiple backups running. In order to guarantee that
all controllers see the same network state, every switch must be connected to every controller, but as
specified in section 2.2.3.6, only the Master controller writes the messages to the networking devices,
which ensures that duplicate rules are not enforced. In case of controller failure, one of the backup
controllers can take over the role of the previous master, without any outages on the network.
2.2.3.1 Existing Platforms
There are several controller implementations available for use, each with different interfaces, perfor-
mance, and modularity. In [13] a comparative study is performed on available SDN controllers in 2014,
and compare the different characteristics of each controller, like the available interfaces, the language of
implementation, modularity, etc. In the following sections, we explore two of the highest rated solutions,
Floodlight and OpenDaylight.
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2.2.3.2 Floodlight
Floodlight 6 is a java-based SDN controller, and is one the first open-source solutions to gain relevance
in research and industry [14]. The Northbound endpoint provides a REST API (see figure 2.9) to interact
with the switch, which allows developers to get statistics, push flow entries, and more.
Figure 2.9: Floodlight architecture [15]
This controller also provides the OpenFlow interface, and it enables adding several modules, either
through extensions, or through the utilization of the provided REST interface, simplifying the addition of
new features to the base controller. It also provides an useful GUI for easier visualization of the topology,
link state, and port statistics, which is visible in figure 2.10.
6http://www.projectfloodlight.org/floodlight/
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Figure 2.10: Floodlight web display of the topology
2.2.3.3 OpenDaylight
Figure 2.11: OpenDaylight controller architecture [16]
OpenDaylight 7 (ODL) is a project supported by the major vendors. The main differences between ODL
and other controllers is support for other protocols in the southbound interface, due to the creation of a
Service Abstraction Layer (SAL) [16]. In a high level overview, the creation of the Model-Driven SAL
allows to extend the controller basic functionality by the addition of several plugins, which are used in
combination with a RESTCONF [17] interface, defining the data models for the data stores, and the
RPCs for interaction between the data.
7https://www.opendaylight.org/
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Figure 2.12: OpenDaylight Topology
2.2.3.4 Data center monitoring with SDN
The centralized view that SDN controllers maintain over the networks allows for it to keep the informa-
tion about the flows currently present in the network. As such, the SDN paradigm allows for flexible
control of the path the packets take in the network, and improves performance of the network at a large
scale. By joining the information available on DCN and SDN, the requirements for traffic engineering
(TE) in SDN, from the perspective of flow control are flow management, fault tolerance and traffic anal-
ysis [18]. This set of four requirements set the base for properly monitoring a DCN from the perspective
of the SDN paradigm.
The next section are taken from [18].
2.2.3.5 Flow management
Flow management refers to the capability that the controller has to set rules for packet forwarding, and
maintain the low overhead that is associated with registering a new flow rule, and also limiting the amount
of flow entries, as hardware switches usually have a set amount of flow entries that they can support.
If we consider the fat-tree topology, one obvious consequence is the fact that if one controller is
responsible for the management of the entire underlying topology, a bottleneck can be created when
the rules need to be deployed to a node. When the switch receives a new packet, and there are no
rules to properly forward this packet, then the packet is redirected to the controller, on the form of a
PACKET_IN message, and after processing this packet, a new flow rule is sent to the switch. The
problem with this scenario lies in the delay that it takes between the reception of the packet, and the
installation of the new flow entry, which can be a contributing factor in packet losses in the data plane.
This is an attack vector that is also explored in Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks for SDN
platforms, as in an extreme scenario, the spoofed packet addresses will not have matches on the tables,
which then result on overflowing the controller [19].
A solution for this issue is then related to decreasing the number of messages sent to the controller, by
introducing some load balancing concepts. One of these concepts is related to the way that we can install
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the flow entries on the switch. The information present in the packets serve to generate the flow-match
entries that are deployed on the table. To reduce the number of interactions between the controller and
OF switches, then we can reduce the number of match fields present in the flow rules, which reduces the
number of flow entries on the switch and the controller messages. Another solution is distributing the
controller among the network, but keeping them connected via a separate channel.
2.2.3.6 Fault tolerance
Although the switches are connected in a way that are able to mitigate link or other switch failures, in
the case of faults occurring there needs to be the possibility of creation of new forwarding rules. An even
bigger concern lies in the case when the controller fails, which will pose a larger problem in the network.
For the case of node failure, fast recovery means that the OF controller can reactively act on link failures,
by signaling the switches to forward packets toward new locations; or proactively, by setting the rules
prior to the occurrence of the failure. In the case that the failure is short lived, then the controller is also
responsible of resetting the paths to the optimal state. The way that controllers handle their connection
is independent of the OpenFlow connection, and the failover should occur with minimal changes to the
underlying flow rules and overhead.
2.2.3.7 Traffic analysis
So that the management tools can correctly display information about the state of the network, status
statistics should be continuously collected and analysed. These statistics should provide the information
about flows, packets and ports, so that the measured metrics can serve as a baseline for the decisions
of the controller to adapt the flow rules to enable the best possible performance. Statistics can be col-
lected in two possible ways: by continuously sampling packets from the switches; or applying sampling
techniques and generalizing the information from the sampled data [20]. The problem here lies in the
collection of the statistics poses a problem for large scale deployments, where continuously polling the
network devices introduces both overhead and very large amounts of data to be parsed, or the data is not
enough to detect failures in a short amount of time.
2.2.4 Statistics
2.2.4.1 OpenFlow
After exploring the requirements for network management, and the way the SDN model can support
developing better systems, we now focus on the possibilities for obtaining this information from the
networking devices. The OpenFlow protocol maintains a set of counters for each flow entry, port and
group statistics, and this information can be queried to obtain a general view on the status of each OF
switch. By sending specific controller-to-switch messages, the switch will return a set of the maintained
statistics, which can then be parsed and analysed further.
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Sending the port statistics message returns an array with the measured counters for each port. These
counters include information like the amount of received and transmitted bytes/ packets, errors and
dropped packets, and the duration that the port is alive.
The next important message is the OFMP_FLOW message, since this allows for getting the individ-
ual flow statistics, and obtain the information about each flow entry, including the time that it has been
set on the switch, the number of packets/bytes in the flow, and the match fields. Also worth noting are
the aggregate flow messages which describe how many packets are in the total flow entries, and also the
number of flow entries that exist.
Also relevant is the information that is retrieved using the group statistics, as they allow to monitor
the number of flows that direct to the group, and again the packet/ byte count that are matched with this
group.
The information provided from these messages allows for a comprehensive view of the state of each
switch, and a Network Management System (NMS) can utilize this information to achieve an under-
standing of the state of the network.
2.2.4.2 sFlow
One problem arises, however, when periodic requests generate too much information, and the control
channel is overflowed with messages of port statistics, which is a possible scenario when the flow tables
start getting too large. As such, a different alternative is to sample a small amount of packets from the
switch, send the packet headers to the controller. One approach to this method is sFlow, a standard for
collection, analysis and storage of network flows and traffic, for each device and its interfaces. sFlow is
implemented using embedded agents on switches and routers, which compile interface and flow samples
and exports them to the sFlow collector via datagrams.
Due to the problems that arise with continuously collecting traffic data, packet sampling has emerged
as a valid solution to this problem, by collecting every n-th packet. The simplicity of the technique allows
for reducing the complexity of sFlow agents, and having the sampling operation being done in hardware,
resulting in the collection of the samples being done at the same speed of the channel it is monitoring.
This reduces the losses that are inherent to the sampling process, which leads to biased analysis of the
traffic [21].
Figure 2.13 shows the basic architecture that composes the sFlow system. One advantage of this
system is the number of systems that incorporate sFlow agents 8, allowing for a detailed analysis of
flows, and enabling flexibility for scalability in the network. By utilizing a sFlow collector that can accu-
rately collect and process the datagrams incoming from the Agents, this protocol can be used to control
most of the central aspects in network management, like troubleshooting network problems; controlling
congestion on the network; or even analysing the possible security threats internal and external to the
network.
8Complete list of compliant devices: http://www.sflow.org/products/network.php
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Figure 2.13: Architectural components of sFlow
2.3 BISDN
Figure 2.14: Basebox architecture
As the SDN market grows larger and larger in the networking world, new applications and prod-
ucts are developed and improved. Seeing the prevalence of closed source and proprietary solutions for
this market, a need for open products that enable further growth and innovation in cloud DCNs is evi-
dent. The main gain in moving from vertically integrated solutions, is the decrease of costs involved, as
cheaper solutions can be found in whitebox 9 switches and open sourced networking applications. With
this motivation, BISDN developed Basebox, a Linux-powered solution to integrate switches and SDN
controllers, allowing for data center operators to configure and manage networks using linux commands,
removing the need for having to manage several devices with different interfaces and workflows, and
adding the capability of running standard networking applications on top of the controllers and switches.
9whitebox switches are generic switches that possess no association to a certain vendor
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Basebox also includes the possiblity of running in a failover scenario, by introducing a backup controller
for the network, and the possibility of creating a giant switch abstraction, by adding another controller,
Capability AWare Routing (CAWR), and having this manage all the southbound switches.
2.3.1 Existing product
2.3.1.1 baseboxd
Figure 2.15: Diagram displaying baseboxd’s capabilities[28]
baseboxd is a controller daemon connecting whitebox switches with a Linux-based system. The
controller communicates with the Linux kernel over netlink 10 and with the switch using the OpenFlow
Data Path Abstraction (OF-DPA) which will represent the state of the switching infrastructure as part of
the Linux networking stack.
From the perspective of the switch, the baseboxd listens for OFPT_PORT_STATUS async messages,
and updates the state of the interfaces in the Linux kernel, creating tap interfaces for each port that is up,
and deleting them when they go down. On the controller side, the changes done to the interfaces are also
propagated downwards into the switch, for example the addition of VLANs, or setting route to neighbors,
and sends the appropriate flow messages via the OpenFlow protocol. Since baseboxd responds directly
to the relevant netlink messages, it is one of the intended ways to interface with baseboxd. One may use
tools such as iproute2 and systemd-networkd to configure baseboxd through this interface [28].
2.3.1.2 CAWR
CAWR is a secondary OpenFlow controller that creates a giant switch abstraction from a set of whitebox
switches. This giant switch integrates with baseboxd and allows for easy scaling and management of
10netlink is an Inter-Process Communication’s (IPC) socket for exchanging information between the Linux kernel and
userspace applications. This interface provides a communication framework to configure a network’s control plane.
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multiple networking devices. As a secondary controller, it is placed in between baseboxd and the phys-
ical switches, and both its northbound and southbound interfaces are OpenFlow, following the OF-DPA
standard.
CAWR was designed to handle multi-switch configurations, and the current version supports up to
two switches. A host can be connected to each of the switches by a pair of interfaces that have bond
11 mode configured, and the layer 2 traffic across the physical network is properly forwarded. Failover
mechanisms to deliver uninterrupted operation are present, in the case of port or switch failure.
CAWR adds Link-Aggregation Control Procotol (LACP) (IEEE 802.3ad, IEEE 802.1ax) and Link-
layer Discovery Protocol (LLDP) -based (IEEE 802.1ab) topology discovery to the Basebox setup.
CAWR uses LLDP to detect internal links (connections between the switches) to build an initial topol-
ogy, and bonds that are discovered via LACP or have been manually configured are added to the topology
as well. LACP is also used to continuously monitor the link status and detect port connections and dis-
connections on servers that have LACP enabled [28].
Figure 2.16: Diagram displaying CAWR’s capabilities[28]
11Network Interface (NIC) bonding is a process of combining two separate network interfaces into a single interface. This
technique guarantees performance increase and redundancy.
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3.1 Traffic engineering in data centers
Understanding the impact of elephant flows in the normal operation of a data center requires understand-
ing the traffic characteristics of the typical cloud data center. The geographical proximity and localization
of large data centers optimizes the interoperability that applications may require by minimizing propaga-
tion delay that could be present if the links between servers, however cloud data centers used for costumer
faced applications and those employed in data intensive tasks may present different requirements, which
poses a problem in optimizing the underlying network. Furthermore, absence of publicly available data
contributes to the challenge of researching data centers [37].
Typical cloud data centers operate at a ratio of 1:1000 staff members to servers [34], which points to
an essential need for extensible automation and failure recovery plans for optimal operation. Automation
is central for cost reduction strategies in data centers, reducing the impact of failures caused by human
errors.
Cost management is also achieved by improving power consumption, which correlates with improved
methods for balancing load on the servers [42]. Load balancing is the concept of moving the load of an
overloaded server to an underutilized one, which reduces performance degradation, and increase recovery
from failures [40]. In a virtualised environment the possibility of moving Virtual Machines (VMs) across
servers and racks facilitates distributing the load without downtime, but the migration decision is not
trivial due to the large amount of variables involved, for example, the bandwidth, memory and CPU that is
available on each server supporting the migrated VM. Furthermore, if an application’s workload changes
over time, one decision may not apply for further migrations [35]. Netshare [36] proposes a system
that optimizes bandwidth allocation by imposing max-min fair sharing on services, using a centralized
controller for orchestration. In [31], a minimization approach is applied to the migration problem, by
generating a cost function considering the variables associated to VM placement, computing the impact
of moving a certain VM to a physical host, and the migration destination is selected with the least amount
of generated impact.
Caching is the act of duplicating content across a network, in order to optimize access to frequently
accessed content, minimizing network congestion at peak access hours [33]. For Software Defined Net-
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working, the centralized controller provides an optimal environment to implement caching in data centers
due to high level knowledge of the tenants in the network. Moirai [39] presents a programmable data-
plane caching system, that allows to prioritize workloads, providing per-workload bandwidth guarantees.
In [32], the last mile delivery of Video-On- Demand problem is solved with the inclusion of OpenFlow
to create dynamic caches using hardware independent statistics, and provide support for additional poli-
cies like load balancing. These systems show an evolution from historical caching mechanisms, that do
not tend to support operations necessary in data center network operations, with higher bandwidth and
storage requirements [39].
3.1.1 DCN Traffic
The techniques proposed for traffic engineering in traditional networks do need to be revised in DCN’s,
since metrics like propagation delay can be negligible, due to the physical proximity of nodes in DC’s
[57]. However, research in this topic can be a difficult task, since many data center operators do not
publish information about their applications and services.
By collecting data from different types of DC’s, several studies have been made about the traffic
characteristics [37, 59, 58]:
 The placement of VMs and servers effects the bandwidth and link capacity, due to the variety of
applications that can be running on the servers at any time, and this non-uniform placement of
VMs contributes to higher amounts of traffic originating from the same rack
 The majority of flows 1 are described as being small in size, and short in duration, which are usually
described as mice flows. The counterpart to these are the elephant flows, which occupy a very
large share of the bandwidth, and degrade application performance, due to a choking effect to the
latency-sensitive mice flows. Applications are tied to the type of traffic they generate, where online
gaming, VoIP and multimedia broadcasting usually originate mice flows, where the large data
transfers and file-sharing generate elephant flows. Despite 90% flows are small and last hundreds
of milliseconds, total traffic volume is largely dominated by the remainder, called elephant flows
[37]
 In a normal situation, link utilization is low in the layers apart from the core switches. In addition
to this discovery, losses are not associated with spikes in traffic, instead being related to high
utilization of the link, which is one of the effects of the previously mentioned elephant flows.
Software Defined Networking based monitoring allows to increase the capability of conducting traf-
fic monitoring and measurements. OpenTM [38] utilizes the monitoring information to build the Traffic
Matrix (TM) of an OpenFlow network by employing different methods of querying the switches, al-
lowing to reduce the load associated with these queries and taking into account the different processing
1flows are sequences of packets sent from a source to a certain destination, either host, anycast or multicast domain
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power of each device. Another method for estimating the link utilization is present in FlowSense [44], in
which PACKET_IN and FLOW_REMOVED OpenFlow messages are monitored since these messages
carry information of arrival of new flows and expiration of flow entries, providing a zero-overhead mon-
itoring technique. This method has optimal performance when the flows in the network are short lived,
posing worse performance as the flow time increases. Due to the absence of these messages in longer
lived flows, the performance decreases when applying this technique on elephant flows.
3.1.2 Elephant flows
Detection of network anomalies is subject to intense research, and as such, several methods were devel-
oped, that assume different levels of control over the network and provide different results to different
use cases. In this section we focus on the available techniques for detection and mitigation of large flows.
3.1.2.1 General formulation of elephant flows
Networks can be represented as an undirected graph G(V;E), which contains a certain multicast group
M  V , and a multicast tree T  E [49]. Considering the nodes u;v 2 M, and the unique paths pu!v,
an approach to define elephant flows is to consider the set of flows that optimize the Quality-of-Service
(QoS) on the unicast path p, or the multicast tree T such as in [49, 56].
Considering the set of flows F on the path p,
F =< F1;F2; :::;Fn >;
and an arbitrary Quality of Service function q(), then xp = q(F) is the QoS requirements for path p.
In [47], the optimal partition is the configuration that improves the QoS in p, or, in a formal definition:
q(F 01;F
0
2; :::F
0
n)> q(F1;F2; :::;Fn);
where F 0X is an optimized set of flows on path p. q() is a generic function, since QoS can be classified
with several parameters, like bandwidth, latency, error rate, and so on, which must then be adapted
from case to case. These parameters can be classified in two classes: bottleneck and additive [49]. As
previously mentioned, the main effect of elephant flows is the choking effect of the bandwidth of the
shorted lived flows, making the bandwidth a proper metric for usage in q(). Considering bandwidth as
the global QoS requirement Q, F 0p must satisfy the condition
x0p = QF2p;
since bandwidth can be classified as a bottleneck parameter, where the link with the lowest bandwidth
sets the total for the link. Considering the additive case, where the delay of the links can be used as an
example, the total delay of the links will be the sum of the delays of each link.
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Using this notation, < F 0e ;F 0m > identifies the optimal QoS partition where Fe is the set of elephant
flows, and Fm is the set containing mouse flows. From this framework, the set of elephant flows F 0e is
F 0e =< F
0
1; :::;F
0
X > F;
that correspond to the smallest set of of flows that maximize the QoS function for a set of links.
Formally, this restriction can be defined as
min(X);
max(q(F 0e))< Q:
3.1.2.2 Elephant flow detection
The problem of detection of traffic anomalies has been subject to extensive research, and several different
approaches have been proposed. These methods are based on different techniques [20]:
 Modifications to the applications and services to notify the controller about the state of the traf-
fic on each service. Despite this approach resulting in the most accurate "detection" of network
anomalies, support for this technique is not extensive, due to the required changes to each service,
and it does not account for abrupt changes on the traffic
 By setting hard limits on the transmission capabilities of each port and switch, and enforcing via
shaping mechanisms, the controller is ensured of the non existence of flows that could impact
network performance. This is a mitigation strategy that does not scale well to very large networks,
since it requires the storage of the rules imposed to every port, and can potentially lead to the
inefficient use of network resources, reducing the flexibillity on the DCN’s.
 By employing sampling and collection techniques, using mechanisms like sFlow (see 2.2.4.2), and
building the profile of the normal state of the network, this method can detect outliers that deviate
from the normal state of the network. Utilizing this method reduces the impact of continuously
polling the network, while reducing impact on the packet and byte counts [21], but the loss of
information inherent to sampling may be a challenge to successful deployments, which should
account for optimal sampling strategies and inference from the obtained statistics.
 Periodic polling of the statistics from the switch, and employing statistical analysis methods to
determine change points in the state of the network.
Mahout [20] presents a system that allows for elephant flow detection by monitoring end hosts. Via
implementation of a shim layer on top of every host present in the network, the proposed system allows
to tag the traffic that belongs to larger flows, reducing the complexity that is generated if the monitoring
were done at the aggregation or core switches. Detection itself is done by comparing the number of bytes
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in a buffer to a pre-defined threshold. In Hedera [45] the problem of maximizing network bandwidth is
via detection of large flows and optimization of the placement of the switches according to the demands
of these flows. A sampling approach for detection of network anomalies is explored in [43], where the
proposed method relies on analysing the sampled packets and building a tuple of the traffic characteristics
(source and destination IP, source and destination ports, and the protocol). Using machine learning
methods, this system then compares the entropy of each field to a pre-defined threshold, which allows
for detection and classification of different types of DDoS attacks. In TE, the use of entropy has been
vastly discussed [21, 41], since it can be used in fine grained traffic engineering systems, as well as
anomaly detection systems, since entropy based methods detect the changes in traffic distribution, and
changes that would be too small for volume change detectors are visible in these systems. Furthermore,
traffic classification is now possible, since similar changes in traffic distribution cause the same changes
in entropy, and this factor can be used in classifying the different types of DDoS attacks, for example.
In the case of systems that explore the changes in packet and bytes, [30] proposes a simple approach
for traffic change detection, based on time series and Principal component analysis (PCA). By measur-
ing the state of the network, using the links, flows and packets statistics, a statistical approach to finding
the time locations of change points in the network traffic is designed, by combining different types of
statistical process control techniques. PCA removes the correlation of a set of observations, separating
the seasonal variation from the residual variability. Another system exploring PCA for anomaly detec-
tion is studied in [48], where traffic flow measurements from Origin-Destination (OD) links are used to
determine the anomalies present in the link.
3.1.2.3 Elephant flow mitigation
Now that the methods for identifying elephant flows were presented, discussion of mitigation techniques
to decrease the impact on the smaller, latency sensitive flows must be addressed.
In general, post-detection actions for solving elephant flows can be based in [51, 50]
 separating the queues for elephants and mice flows,
 routing the elephants on a separate path or forwarding them in separate networks,
 splitting the elephants into smaller flows, using different ports and relying on reliable transmission
mechanisms, such as those present on TCP to organize and re-order the packets.
A novel approach for mitigation of elephant flows is present in [52], where the timeout present in
OpenFlow rules in presented as a dynamic way to manage the control plane load and improve the usage
of flow table resources, managing the flows based in their inter packet arrival interval and periodicity.
Basic functionality of this system is the management of the timeout setting of each flow, since, if this
is proven to be too long for flows with long inter packet arrival periods, the flow rules on the switch
could become out dated, leading to a possible switch table overflow; and if the timeouts are too short,
the control plane can be overloaded, causing possible controller failures.
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Another solution proposed for managing elephant flows are present in congestion-aware systems,
where the routing or forwarding decisions are done with a dynamic overview of each link properties.
The proposals in congestion-aware systems are relevant, due to the inefficiency of Equal-cost multi-path
(ECMP) routing in data centers, which causes low throughput and bandwidth utilization for elephant
flows, and increases latency for mice flows [53]. In [54], link capacity is managed per flow by analysing
the flow deadline 2. The reasoning behind analysis of the flow deadline is due to splitting resources on
the link. If the link’s capacity is shared equally between every flow, then every flow will arrive at the
same time, but likely the deadline will have been missed by some. Furthermore, consideration of the
flow implies that every packet must arrive before the deadline. In the case of elephant flow mitigation,
assigning larger portions of the link’s capacity to the shorter flows can be a possible strategy. A similar
approach is present in [55], instead analysing Round-Trip Time (RTT), since this metric directly reflects
the end-to-end latency of a link.
3.2 Time series analysis
As a result of the large scale of current data centers, maintaining control over these networks proves a
difficult task. Networks operators must then adapt to the current situation by improving the monitoring
infrastructures to allow faster response to problems, and Root-Cause Analysis (RCA) 3 of the source
of network issues can be done faster and easier, which will reflect on better service and lower costs for
network operators.
Network behaviour analysis is defined by the constant monitoring of a network, so that events that
compromise the "healthy" state of the network can be removed or mitigated. These include not only cases
where the anomalies are caused with malicious intent, like the case of DDoS attacks, but also failure of
network devices or changes in user behaviour [30]. These systems are equipped with alarm capabilities,
so that system administrators can quickly respond to changes, possibly even giving some information
about the source of the problem. However, the automation of these monitoring processes means that the
possible existence of false alarms reduces the operators capabilities to act on actual failures.
Understanding processes and their results is a key factor in the success of implementing new features,
or analysing existing ones for their efficiency and output. This analysis, important for the different fields
in engineering, economics, health, allows obtaining information about the normal and abnormal state
of each underlying process, provide forecasts and predictions on short and long term behaviour of the
relevant data, classify and cluster information, and more. The act of collecting and processing the data,
over a period of time is called time series analysis.
Monitoring systems provide a guarantee in quality engineering, since they allow to follow a system
and its properties, and notify operators if changes happen that impact the normal status of a relevant pa-
rameter. These changes can be occasional or systematic, but should the state of the system deviate from
2Flow deadline is defined as the time that the flow has to finish transmission, usually due to Service Level Agreements
(SLAs)
3method of identifying the initiating cause of an error or fault in a system
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the limits set by the operators, researching the cause of the errors can reveal some errors or malfunctions
in the system. Change detection is the study of the different parameters of the system, and determining
the points where these cause a significant deviation from the normal operation. In network traffic analy-
sis, these methods can be applied to determine when the behaviour of certain flows, that can be monitored
over metrics originating from the controller and switches, impact the traffic characteristics. One key part
on the application of changepoint detection is the understanding and selection of the proper metrics to
monitor, to ensure that these are sensitive to the traffic changes. One other important consideration in
applying changepoint detection mechanisms is the reduction of false alarms, that occur when the metrics
are too sensitive to traffic changes, and limit the network operators capability of accurately responding
to real network issues.
Change detection mechanisms are classified as follow [30]:
 Online vs Offline In change detection theory, an important distinction is the difference between
online and offline detection. Offline, or batch detection methods consider a fixed length of observa-
tions, and retrospectively analyse the dataset to determine the time where the change, or changes
took place. Online detection, or sequential detection, unlike batch detection which uses all the
available observations to detect the changes, including the ones obtained after the change took
place, is based on the determination of the change points based on the arrival of the new data,
allowing for determining the change as fast as possible [60].
 Parametric vs Non-parametricAnother important distinction is related to the scalability, and
the amount of data that needs to be stored to accurately implement detection on new samples.
Parametric approaches rely on learning a probability distribution from the monitored variables,
and using this learned data to estimate the unknown parameters, after which the training data can
be discarded. Non-parametric models however, do not take into consideration the distribution of
the monitored variables, and analyse statistical properties instead. The cost of this analysis is that
the previous data must be stored to provide better results, but this problem can be mitigated using
algorithms like sliding windows or moving averages.
3.2.1 Mathematical formulations
A time series can be defined as a stream of observations X = fx1; :::xig, where xi is a vector arriving at
time i. The time series X can also be described as the sum (in equation 3.1), or product (in equation 3.2)
of the following components: St , which refers to the seasonal component of the data; Tt , which defines
the trend of the data, and Rt represents the residual values, accounting for uexpected variation and noise.
X = St +Tt +Rt ; (3.1)
Or:
X = St Tt Rt (3.2)
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In regards to the classification of the trends according to the type of change, they can be classified as:
 Deterministic when the trend is consistently increasing/decreasing
 Stochastic when the opposite happens
Time series data usually present a non stationary behaviour, that is characterized by changes in the
mean and variance. Statistical methods require, however, stationarity in the data. The presence of trends
and cyclic behaviours is the most common violation of stationary, and table 3.1 shows the most common
trends present in the data, and the parameters that need to be learned from the time series in study.
Linear y= m  x+b
Polynomial y= b+ c1  x+ : : :+ cn  xn
Exponential y= c  xb
Logarithmic y= a  ln(x)+b
Table 3.1: Trend models
Removing systematic changes like trends is also possible with differencing,
ÑXt = Xt  Xt 1:
3.2.2 Forecasting
Time-series’ have the possibility of applying statistical models to extract the next value prediction based
on past observations. Under the assumption that the underlying process can be modeled by previous
historical values, and assuming this model remains true for future measurements, the time series data
historical behaviour can be used to generate these forecasts for future values in the time series.
3.2.2.1 Exponential smoothing
Exponential smoothing allows for generating predictions using the historical behaviour, by applying a set
of weights to the data that exponentially decreases over time. Considering the time series Xt , the one-step
ahead prediction xˆt can be obtained by equation 3.3. In this model, the smoothing factor a(0 < a < 1)
should be obtained empirically, and its value will determine the forgetting factor for the past observations.
xˆ1 = x0;
xˆt = axt +(1 a)xˆt 1; t > 1:
(3.3)
Due to its simplicity, this method is not suitable for situations where the data has trends, or seasonal
behaviours [62]. The solution for this problem is introduced with double exponential smoothing, also
know as Holt forecasting, and triple exponential smoothing, also known as Holt-Winters forecasting.
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These methods introduce further components to dampen the effects of cyclic behaviours in the data.
Double exponential smoothing is defined by [30] :
xˆt = Lt 1+Tt 1;
Lt = axt +(1 a)(Lt 1+Tt 1);
Tt = b (Lt  Lt 1)+(1 b )Tt 1:
And triple exponential smoothing is defined by:
xˆt = Lt 1+Tt 1+ It 1;
Lt = a(xt   It s)+(1 a)(Lt 1+Tt 1);
Tt = b (Lt  Lt 1)+(1 b )Tt 1;
It = g(xt  Lt)+(1  g)It s:
The components these methods introduce account for the cyclic behaviours in the data: Lt accounts
for the baseline behaviour of the data, which is calculated on the simple method; Tt smooths the trend
with the b parameter; and St accounts for the seasonal components with the g parameter. As with a
these parameters should be defined mostly by previous experience.
3.2.2.2 Autoregressive Moving average
Approximating the time series data to a model allows for generating predictions for the next values, since
the relationship between two variables in the data is then known. The Box-Jenkins method defines the
steps of building this model as [61]:
1. Identification Model the data, by reducing the variables to a stationary state, and removing the
possible seasonality in the series
2. Fitting Estimate the parameters for the model
3. Checking Verify if the model accurately fits the available data, returning to the identification step
if its not adequate
Modelling the time series data is possible through moving average (MA), autoregression (AR) or a
mix of the two (ARMA) processes. The autoregressive model, also referred to as AR(p), considers the
linear regression of the p past values, as equation 3.4 shows.
xt =
p
å
i=1
fiXt i+ et ; (3.4)
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where et is the white noise component, a purely random process of mean 0 and variance s2, fi are
the constant parameters of the model, and p defines the order of the model.
The moving average process models the time series to the white noise that has occurred in the pre-
vious periods, as shown in equation 3.5. In this equation, qi are the parameters of the model, m is the
mean of the series, and et are the white noise components. Similarly as in the autoregressive model, the
moving average process can be defined as MA(q), where q is the order of this model.
xt =
q
å
i=1
qiei+m; (3.5)
Finally, the ARMA(p, q) process is defined as the combination of both methods, as shown in equation
3.6.
xt = m+
q
å
i=1
qiei+
p
å
i=1
fiXt i: (3.6)
Finding the p and q parameters of the models is done via observation of autocorrelation and partial
autocorrelation functions, as introduced in the Box-Jenkins method [61]. The autocorrelation function
calculates the correlation of a time series with its own lagged values. The behaviour of this function
can provide us with the information on the these parameters: if the sample autocorrelation shows an
exponential decrease then the process can be modelled with an AR method; and if this function shows a
drop after a certain value q, then the moving average model is better suited for modelling the time series
[30].
3.2.2.3 Error calculation
A very important part of building forecasting modules is assessing the associated errors with the predic-
tion. Minimizing prediction errors improves the quality of the forecasts, via the adjustment of the chosen
parameters for the model.
A common way to calculate the error is via the Squared Sum of Errors (SSE), which is shown in
equation 3.7.
SSE =
T
å
t=1
(xt   xˆt)2 =
T
å
t=1
e2t (3.7)
Other methods include the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE),
RMSE =
s
T
å
t=1
(xt   xˆt)2
n
or the Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE),
MAPE =
100
n
T
å
t=1
xt   xˆtxt
;
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In [72] a comparative study of these measures is presented to determine the most adequate mea-
sure for univariate time series forecasts. They analyse simple forecasting methods like the exponential
smoothing and Holt’s method, and the out-of-sample 4 and in-sample 5 performance of these methods.
This analysis of the different forecasting accuracy measures is finished by concluding that the Mean Ab-
solute Scaled Error (MASE), seen in equation 3.8 due to simple interpretations, and independent of the
scale of the data, which poses problems when comparing forecasts with different scales. In equation 3.8,
the numerator et is the forecast error for a certain period, or et = xt   xˆt .
MASE =
1
T
T
å
t=1
 
jet j
1
T 1 å
T
t=2 jxt   xt 1j
!
(3.8)
3.2.2.4 Change Detection
A relevant indicator for the validity of the generated forecasts is the forecast error, that is calculated
via the difference between the real measurements and the predicted value. Furthermore, by assuming a
distribution for the forecast error, and a certain significance level, it is possible to validate the generated
forecasts, and detect values that do not fit the model, accusing a possible variation in the parameters of
the model. As such, the prediction error is able to be employed in change detection algorithms. This
prediction error can be defined as:
et = xt   xˆt
Hypothesis testing is used to perform a test of an assumption about two random variables. This
hypothesis states that a certain relationship between the two variables exists with a certain significance
value, and this relationship can be a relation in the means, the distribution of the observations, etc. The
first step is set null hypothesis, which is the desired assumption to test, and is referred to as H0, which is
then tested against the alternative hypothesis,H1, which is considered true ifH0 is rejected. The validity
of H0 is based on a comparison between the two data sets, according to a certain threshold, called the
significance level. This significance level also defines the probability of wrongly rejecting or accepting
a hypothesis, which are defined as following errors: Type I error, happening when the null hypothesis
is rejected, but the performed test is true, and the Type II errors, occurring when the opposite happens.
Originating from quality engineering, control charts are common ways of following the output of
a certain process, with the aim of reducing variability associated to manufacturing processes. Control
charts allow to evaluate the possible sources of variation, and classify the output of the process, based on
the mean or variation of the sampled process, as in control or out of control, depending on the causes of
variation. The process is considered in control when the parameters of the monitored variable, like m0 or
s2 are inside the predefined control limits, that are usually set as requirements for the process. The wide
range of control charts allow for a flexibility in choosing the right one that fits each application. Common
4used for evaluating the forecasting accuracy, by using samples not belonging to the initial fitting period
5using data available on the initial fitting period to generate one step ahead forecasts
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charts used are those proposed by Shewhart, where the measurements from the process in study provide
a statistic, like the mean, range, etc. Plotting these parameters allows for drawing the center line at H0,
and the control limits are defined by a multiple of the standard deviation. This control chart allows for
actions to the process be performed not only when the points are shown to be out of control, but also
when there is a sequence of values above or below the center line, or a upward or downward trend is
shown in the control charts.In the context of change detection, the hypothesis test relies on H0 stating
that there is no change in the parameters of the sample like the mean or the variation, and the second
hypothesis H1 stating the contrary.
The CUSUM (cumulative sum) control chart provides a test based on stopping rules, where the
alarms are raised when a parameter of the distribution qt , like the mean, or the variance exceeds certain
thresholds. In the parametric case, the CUSUM algorithm for detection of a change at t0 from the
observation xi is based on the log likelihood ratio defined by [60].
St =
k
å
i=1
si =
k
å
i=1
ln
Pq1(xi)
Pq0(xi)
:
The previous equation is related to the negative drift of St under normal conditions, and the positive
drift after a change is detected. The alarm is raised when a test statistic gt is larger than a threshold h,
and can be obtained by
gt = St   min
1it
Si h
In the case when Pq (x) is not known, the log likelihood parameter cannot be calculated, a non-
parametric approach must be used, as mentioned in [60].
3.2.2.5 Performance Evaluation
A relevant metric for designing change detection models for application under network traffic is the false
alarm rate, due to the impact that incorrectly identifying the normal state of the network as abnormal
can have on the operators capability of addressing real abnormalities. This statistical difference of errors
present in hypothesis testing is not relevant for network operators [30], which implies that the design of
the change detection mechanisms should reduce the total false alarm rate. The effectiveness of a statis-
tical approach for change detection can be seen as the relationship between false and real alarms, since
the trade-off with online detection is the number of falsely raised alarms, and the number of accurately
reported changes. As mentioned in section 3.2.2.4 the possible wrong decisions are the type I and II
errors, which are usually represented with error, or confusion matrices, seen in table 3.2, where the pos-
sible outcomes from the decision algorithm are displayed. The notation for this table is True Positive
(TP), False Positive (FP), False Negative (FN) and True Negative (TN).
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Predicted
H0 H1
A
ct
ua
l H0 TP FP
H1 FN TN
Table 3.2: Generalized confusion matrix for hypothesis testing
In the following equations, we define the ratios that allow for measuring the performance of the
algorithm, with Accuracy (A), measuring the correct decision of the algorithm; Sensitivity (S), indicating
the capability of the system to detect the change, and Precision (P) indicates the ability of the algorithm
to accurately distinguish between true and false alarms.
A=
TP+TN
TP+TN+FP+FN
=
TP+TN
Nalarms
S=
TP
TP+FN
P=
TP
TP+FP
The performance of the change detection algorithms can also be defined by:
 MTFA (Mean Time Between False Alarms)
 MTD (Mean Time to Detection)
 ARL (Average Run Length)
The ARL is the expected number of samples required before an alarm is provided, and it can be
divided further in two important measures: ARL0, which specifies the expected number of required
samples until the alarm is raised, assuming that the process is in control; and the ARL1, indicating the
expected number of samples until an alarm is raised, under the condition that the process is out of control.
For optimal results for change detection, we require that ARL0 is as large as possible, and ARL1 be as
small as possible.
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4.1 Problem
Developing solutions for use in mission critical environments requires the deep understanding and anal-
ysis of the requirements of these environments, like those present in large data centers. The Basebox
system (see section 2.3) is an example of these solutions, but lacks a system for monitoring and manage-
ment of the network devices. Such a system should
 display the topology information reported by CAWR, including the internal switch links, and the
LACP discovered bond interfaces on the servers,
 display the port and link statistics for both switches,
 design an alerting system, so that network operators can be informed of changes on the network
state,
 provide diagnostic capabilities.
Also addressed by this system should be the definition of Quality-of-Service (QoS) policies, that
maintains the levels of accepted traffic behaviour of each device in the network, and identifies and ap-
plies some automatic mitigation strategy when the system does not perform according to normal state.
By understanding data center traffic characteristics, one of the largest problems are the existence of ele-
phant flows, that impact the available bandwidth of the network. As such, the development of a full
management system should also include a system that receives the incoming port statistics, analyses
these, and applies statistical analysis to manage the impact caused by elephant flows.
4.2 Solution
Following the previously presented requirements, the proposed system is present in figure 4.1. First, we
add an interface for the controllers that exposes management information like the network’s topology,
statistics, etc. After this, we build an Operations Support System (OSS) that provides the basis for
the development of applications that monitor the state of the network, using the implemented API to
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Figure 4.1: High-level visual description of the proposed system
obtain the relevant information. This system allows further separation of roles in the network, in con-
trast to a system where the controller would gather the roles of managing and monitor the network’s
status, increasing the load on the controllers. Furthermore, this architecture increases the modularity of
the components, enabling hot-swapping different modules, and allows parallel development of different
features in the monitoring and management stack.
We provide a proof-of-concept composed of two components: the first is a Graphical User Interface
(GUI) providing an user friendly interface to display topology and statistics, and the second is an intelli-
gent system enabling the detection of elephant flows. In this section we describe in a high level way the
approaches for the development of this system.
4.2.1 GUI
The primary use case for this component is following the changes in the underlying topology, while also
allowing the monitoring some aspects of the port statistics, and as such, the links between switches and
the hosts, and the association between the ports and the switches should be displayed. Performance wise,
this system must run as fast as possible, and the transmission of data must not interfere with the systems
operation.
In order to reduce the memory requirements of the platform, and decrease the time that it takes for
drawing topology updates, a decision was made to not store state, which would increase the time it
takes for topology updates, with queries to store and load data from these databases. This also removes
complexity as the system grows, where storing information about links and switches would dramatically
increase database size.
Motivated by compatibility with standardized systems, choosing the data model for representing the
underlying system required the investigation of similar systems, and the RFCs, or similar standardized
documents that exist.
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4.2.2 Elephant Flow detection
The second component of our system was developed for monitoring the system statistics, and displaying
alerts when elephant flows are detected. For this end, we have implemented an algorithm for the detection
part.
By monitoring traffic changes in the switches ports, the developed system aims to detect the presence
of large flows based on the traffic statistics obtained from the API. As we assume the tree topology in
data centers, seen in figure 2.2, the testing environment must be designed to monitor the lower layer edge
switches, connected directly to the physical hosts. By monitoring the ports on these switches, we detect
changes in the reported traffic statistics via a developed Python script.
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Basebox is a SDN controller used in data centers, which are a mission critical component for network
operators. As such, management capabilities so that managing and operating infrastructure must be a
central component of this system. There are several steps necessary to understand the problem and be
able to choose the most appropriate design. In this chapter we present the information required to build
this system:
 Understanding and organizing the information available on the network controllers according to a
set of data models;
 Analyse the available protocols for handling the transport between the network controllers and the
Graphical User Interface;
 Decide on the GUI server back-end, and how the visual interface should look like.
5.1 Data models
Data models are abstract concepts that map the properties of entities and organizes their attributes, and
how they relate to each other. To create a switch management interface, the entities we want to model are
the switches themselves, with attributes like the switch name, port counters, and the relationships of the
data will allow us to display the links and topology of the network. One of the considerations that were
taken into account when choosing the data models was the compatibility with standardized data models
by the organizational entities like the IETF 1 and OpenConfig 2.
The NETCONF [68] network configuration model, which we explore further in 5.2.1 also defines a
data modelling language known as YANG, which is used in this protocol to model its configuration and
data, and the remote procedure calls [67]. YANG data model defines the hierarchy of data between a
NETCONF client and server with the objective of smooth integration with the existing system’s infras-
tructure.
1https://www.ietf.org/
2http://openconfig.net/
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The systems we aim to model are two: the topology between the servers and switches, and the port
statistics for each port one the switch. Since there is no data model that would accurately describe both
of them correctly, for the topology we chose the IETF network data model [65], and for the port counters
the OpenConfig interfaces data model 3.
5.1.1 Topology
The topology data model maps a collection of nodes, and the relationships between each node, called
a link. This also allows for describing the network in a vertical hierarchy, by displaying relationships
between several layers, which can then be used to display the entire networking stack, for example
displaying the physical links between nodes, their connections at layer 2 and layer 3 of the OSI model,
and the virtualised relationships that the elements could have in a cloud deployment. As the development
of the product continues, and more features are added, for example, layer 3 routing, then we require a
flexible data model that can be extended to support the new capabilities.
Figure 5.1: Example topology hierarchy achievable with this data model [65]
Mapping the data model to the real world data is then adding the two types of information the data
model expects: the first one composed of adding the different networks that composed the entire topol-
ogy, including their nodes and network types; and then using the previous information to build the links
between each of the nodes, using the termination points the model exposes. As seen in 5.1, this data
model can be extended by adding underlying networks, representing the several layers in the networking
stack.
Displaying the topology proved useful for CAWR since this controller is directly connected to the
underlying switches and can see the links among these networking devices. The connection to the servers
3http://ops.openconfig.net/branches/master/docs/openconfig-interfaces.html
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can also be monitored, by configuring LACP on the servers interface to report their status. Figure 5.2
presents this entire data model, as defined by the IETF.
Figure 5.2: The IETF description for the nodes and links in the proposal for network topologies [65]
5.1.2 Port statistics
Modelling the port statistics to build a management interface requires first understanding of the Open-
Flow statistics.
The chosen data model should then accurately model the fields that we need to expose, and the data
type of counters we wish to measure. In this case, the prevalence of other controllers allows to use the
same data models present in their implementations. OpenConfig maintains a set of vendor neutral data
models, written in YANG, allowing network operators to use standardized models for their networking
infrastructure. The entire set of published models can be accessed in their github page 4.
5.2 Protocols
None of the controllers had a clear way of obtaining the statistics apart from manually looking in the ter-
minal and following the logs exposed and waiting for the appropriate output. In this section we describe
the two Remote Procedure Call (RPC) systems that were researched, and focus on the advantages which
led to the final decision of implementing gRPC on Basebox.
4https://github.com/openconfig/public
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5.2.1 NETCONF
IETF developed a protocol that allowed for installation, manipulation and deletion of configuration of
networking devices called NETCONF, which devices use to expose a full API to their systems. This
protocol is set in a client/server communications pattern and is based in the four layers, as can be seen
in the image 5.3. Data models and operations, covered in detail in the previous section, are related to the
Content layer on the image.
Figure 5.3: NETCONF protocol layers [68]
Configuration of a network device can be complex, and managing separate configurations between
device startup and normal operation is a difficult task, but there is occasional need for this capability.
NETCONF defines the existence of different datastores to enable this feature, allowing the network op-
erator to set an initial configuration, used when the device is initialized, and switching to the running
datastore when the device is ready to maintain normal operation. This concept of datastores also enables
the creation of a candidate datastores, providing the capability of testing configurations on the network
device, checking for any possible errors, while making sure that there is no impact on the current con-
figuration of the device. After the changes have been tested and validated, a <commit> operation can be
used to deploy the new configuration to the running datastore.
Another useful feature of the NETCONF protocol, is the possibility of using the rollback-on-error
capability. When rolling a new change, and if the system is enabled to support this feature, NETCONF
can detect errors in the changes done to the configurations, and return the system to the previous state
that is error free.
The NETCONF API provides several operations to interact with the managed devices to get sys-
tem information and push new configurations. The set of supported operations in the base NETCONF
protocol are [68]:
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Table 5.1: NETCONF Operations
get
get-config
edit-config
copy-config
delete-config
lock
unlock
close-session
kill-session
NETCONF is able to run on top of several transport protocols. However, NETCONF requires that a
persistent connection is maintained between devices, and this connection should be reliable, and support
transmission failure. In addition, the security should be handled by the transport layer [66], providing the
guarantee that transactions are done in a cryptographically secure channel, between two authenticated
hosts. As a result, typical NETCONF implementations are based on SSH or TLS protocols.
5.2.2 gRPC
The basic idea behind RPC systems is defining an interaction between remote environments where sub-
routines are executed as if they were executed as a local procedure call. These subroutines are defined
by specifying the methods that can be called, with their parameters and return values.
gRPC defines a data serialization format known as protocol buffers, or protobuf, which is used for
defining the service interface and the structure of the messages. This system is based in HTTP/2, due to
the optimizations present in this protocol, like
 header compression, which reduces overhead in transmission;
 multiplexing of multiple requests over single connections;
 and stream prioritization, which allows the creation of streaming RPCs, where a bi-directional
sequence of messages can be exchanged.
There are some projects 5 that enable the translation between YANG to protobuf, which allows us to
use the data models previously chosen, only adding the extra step to convert the files.
Data serialization is a common task for communication between services, and optimization of this
task, specifically regarding the speed, allows for reducing overheads in the transmission of the data.
A comparative study regarding several serialization formats reports [69], without any optimizations,
protobuf improves performance on serializing and de-serializing messages compared to XML or JSON.
5https://github.com/openconfig/goyang
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Figure 5.4: Operations Support System architecture
5.2.3 Comparison
Despite of both protocols capability of meeting the requirements that were presented to us, the gRPC
framework was chosen due to several reasons:
 Both frameworks allow us to use the standardized data models currently proposed by the IETF and
OpenConfig;
 NETCONF trades information as XML encoded information; while gRPC allows to handle infor-
mation in a way thats native to the language implementation of the client/server;
 The faster serialization of data reduces overheads in the connection and load on the controllers;
 The integration with the existing system was easier: since gRPC has implementations for the
languages that the controllers are developed on (i.e. C++), this framework was easier to implement
than NETCONF, which would have required integration with third party tools.
5.3 Implementation
By combination of the technologies presented in this chapter, we developed an Operations Support Sys-
tem (OSS), visible in figure 5.4. The controllers had to be extended to support the gRPC interfaces, and
this connection is accessible through port 5000 on baseboxd and port 5001 on CAWR.
To demonstrate the interfaces capability of exposing the topology and statistics information, we have
developed a simple Graphical User Interface (GUI) as a proof-of-concept of this platform. This GUI
can be accessed via a web page, since this provides an ease of access to the system. The web page
was developed on top of the Django Framework 6, since it is a framework developed in the Python
6https://www.djangoproject.com/
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programming language, support for official gRPC integration and ease of implementation. For drawing
the topology we used the JavaScript library D3.js 7.
5.3.1 Testing
Testing of this component was done on the setup displayed in image 5.5. This test bed was designed for
testing the Basebox controllers, with configuration of the bonded interfaces on the servers connected to
both switches, represented as BX on the image.
Figure 5.5: Graphical User Interface test setup
7https://d3js.org/
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5.3.2 Proof-of-concept
Figure 5.6: Topology obtained from CAWR
Figure 5.6 displays the topology that CAWR reports, similar to the one in the testing environment 5.5.
Table A.1 displays the meaning of the icons present in the GUI. Since this system is to be used in a real
time deployment, there is no interest in storing the state of the network, which means that the topology
must be drawn with every request to the server. Currently the topology is updated every two seconds,
providing a balance between real time updates and the interval for requests to the controllers.
A drawback present in figure 5.6 is that the controllers do not have the mapping between each inter-
face and the physical host, which is why the connected server is displayed as unknown. This is a known
limitation of the system, that can be solved either by manually updating the host name to port mapping in
a configuration file, or extending the controllers to interpret LLDP messages from the servers, although
this was considered out-of-scope for this proof-of-concept.
The connection between both controllers to the GUI provides the view for both controllers, which
means that CAWR will present the view for the physical switches, bonded ports and hosts, while the
baseboxd only shows the giant switch created by CAWR. An advantage of this is the analysis of the global
view of the state of the network, and further possibilities include the addition of displaying configured
VLANs in each port, and even provide a way to configure these VLANS via a GUI. Interaction with the
nodes is possible, and clicking on each provides an insight to the statistics related to the ports in that
node, as seen in figure 5.7.
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Figure 5.7: Single Port statistics from Baseboxd
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6.1 Elephant flow detection algorithm
Section 3.2.2.4 presents several techniques for time series analysis and change detection, in which we
explore the available techniques for modelling the data in a time series, calculating predictions from a
time series’ historical data (see equation 3.3), and finding change points in this data (see section 3.2.2.4).
Using this mathematical baseline, we built an algorithm that monitors the changes in the traffic charac-
teristics of an interface of a switch.
Algorithm 1 is a high level overview of the steps required to obtain the detection, and in the following
sections, we introduce each step, and provide some clarifications on the design decisions.
Algorithm 1 Elephant Detection Algorithm - High Level
1: procedure ELEPHANT FLOW DETECTION
2: Initialization
3: Query controller
4: loop
5: Calculate prediction error
6: Predict next values
7: Detection
8: if Detection then
9: Raise Alarm
10: end if
11: wait 2 seconds
12: end loop
13: end procedure
6.1.1 Initialization
In equation 6.1, BXX and PXX describe to the port statistics obtained from the controllers (see table 2.1),
the byte (BXX) and packet (PXX) counters, respectively, and the indexes describe if the counters account
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for the transmitted or received data in that port.
xi =
266664
BRX
PRX
BTX
PTX
377775 (6.1)
The initialization step of the algorithm is a crucial step for obtaining correct results in the algorithm.
Algorithm 2 defines the actual steps in this algorithm, allowing the correct initialization of the model
parameters, including the trend component, and to provide a baseline for the expected traffic on the net-
work. It is assumed that no traffic anomalies exist during this stage, but a longer period for initialization
can account for short bursts of higher traffic.
Algorithm 2 Elephant Detection Algorithm - Initialization
1: procedure INITIALIZATION
2: initialization period = 30s
3: while t <= initialization period do
4: x = Query controller
5: initialization measures += x
6: end while
7: Linear Regression (initialization measures)
8: return Linear regression coefficient
6.1.2 Prediction and error calculation
Time series analysis can generate forecasts for future values, assuming the temporal behaviour is main-
tained for future observations. A change detection mechanism analyses the difference between the pre-
dicted value to the observation. In this section we present the prediction and error calculation sections of
the elephant flow detection algorithm.
For calculating forecasts, we have presented in section 3.2.2 two possible methods for generating
predictions. During the design phase of the algorithm, we selected the exponential smoothing technique,
since this is a commonly used technique [29, 30] in the reviewed literature, and provides a generally sim-
ple way to generate forecasts based in historical data. For readers convenience, the prediction equations
are repeated here from section 3.2.1, since they provide the mathematical baseline for the development
of prediction module of the algorithm. The equations are:
xˆ1 = x0;
xˆt = axt +(1 a)xˆt 1; t > 1:
(6.2)
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With this method are able to predict the values that are expected in the following sample. In this
step, the most important consideration is the adjustment of the forgetting factor, a(0 < a < 1), that
determines the impact of previous samples on the calculation of the prediction. The value of this factor
must be adjusted experimentally, by tuning the value according to the desired output.
6.1.3 Detection
The detection component of the algorithm provides the logic for finding the timestamps where a port’s
traffic behaviour changes. For this component we consider two possible techniques: the first, which sim-
ply compares the output of the error calculation to a certain threshold; and a second, using the CUSUM
algorithm (see section 3.2.2.4).
The first analysed detection method is defined as
e2  d ;
and this method provides advantages mainly due to the simplicity of the technique, however previous
knowledge of the change is required to determine a possible threshold d .
The second analysed method is the CUSUM algorithm. This method is used for monitoring parame-
ters of a sample, by monitoring deviations of the observations according to a certain target value. Typical
implementations of this algorithm are based in an offline approach, calculating the alarm times with
knowledge of the entire data set. Since our method is expected to run in an online approach, the adapta-
tion of this algorithm for an online form is based in the application of a sliding window of observations.
The offline method allows us, however, to obtain a baseline for the online detection algorithm. We
have collected the error prediction output, and applied the algorithm to a generated data set. Performing
this step baselines the expected number of alarms that are raised in a certain testing conditions, so that
application of the online algorithm may provide the closest approximation to the optimal offline version.
The chosen CUSUM algorithm implementation used was from https://github.com/demotu/BMC,
and figure 6.1 shows the alarms raised. Furthermore, this implementation also provides us with the
timestamps corresponding to the start and end of the detected changes. This algorithm calculates the
CUSUM of a set of data, and expects two inputs: a threshold parameter, which defines the amplitude
threshold for the change in data; and the drift parameter tunes the algorithm to allow faster detection
(larger drift), or less false alarms (smaller drift).
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Figure 6.1: Offline CUSUM output
The adaptation of the CUSUM algorithm for utilization as an online technique is based on a sliding
window that is updated with every new sample. Applying this method has the advantages of using
the CUSUM algorithm without needing extensive changes, while also reducing the amount of memory
needed to apply this method. Choosing the window size is a central point to a successful implementation
of the change detection mechanism, that is explored further in section 6.3.
6.2 Testing
The design of a testing environment for testing of the change detection algorithm, must allow for the
accurate simulation of the traffic conditions on real DCNs, and should provide the flexibility to under-
stand and change the underlying topologies. This indicates a strong motivation for deploying a testing
environment in a virtualised environment, using tools like mininet, which provides a miniature network
that can be changed as needed. This testing suite provides a strong alternative to deploying these changes
in hardware.
Despite the changes implemented to Basebox, utilizing these controllers in combination with the
virtualised environment poses a challenge, related to the implementation of the OpenFlow protocol in
the hardware and software switches. Hardware switches that were used for the implementation of the
OSS have a modified version of the OpenFlow tables structure, OF-DPA (see section 2.2.1.1), and the
libraries that make up the controller are designed around this. To utilize the controllers, changes to Open
vSwitch or other alternatives steps would be required in order to use the environment, which was decided
out-of-scope for this thesis. Also, the limited access to the hardware setup meant that an alternative
solution was required.
To solve this issue we adopt a different controller for interaction with the virtual environment. In
addition, researching the traffic engineering modules in other controllers provides ideas that can later
be adopted in Basebox. The chosen controller was Floodlight (see section 2.2.3.2), since it exposes a
simple REST API for obtaining statistics, setting table rules, and is continuously maintained providing
an optimal test bed.
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These elements compose the testing environment that seen in 6.2. To ease the installation of the
utilized applications, we based these applications on VMs and containers, and the installation files can
be found on github 1.
Figure 6.2: The high level overview of the testing setup
Figure 6.2 describes the testing setup designed for testing. This setup provides a close approximation
to setups used to the Top-of-Rack switches connected to the servers on the edge layers (see figure 2.2)
of data centers, while keeping the resource consumption of the virtualised network and controller to a
minimum. In the diagram, the hosts are shown using the HX notation, ranging from 1 to 4, and the
switches use the SX notation. Information about the hosts, like the IP and MAC addresses can also be
seen, and the port numbers used are also displayed.
Mininet provides an API to interact with a virtual network and setup tests in a predictable manner.
We utilize this API to develop a script that creates the network topology. For traffic generation, however,
we require another tool that provides specific functionalities like control of the inter-packet interval and
the packets payload size. The tool hping is a common tool used for packet generation and port mapping,
and its simplicity allows to quickly deploy different tests against the designed setups. In picture 6.3 the
command line interface of the tool is presented and the arguments to build the tests are presented.
1https://github.com/rubensfig/thesisdoc.git
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Figure 6.3: hping tool tests and command line arguments
We consider a test scenario, where every host is communicating with each other, simulating back-
ground traffic. This has the purpose of simulating low traffic intensities in the network, and verify the
behaviour of the designed algorithm in an approximation to real conditions. In this test scenario, we
initialize the network with the background traffic for a specified amount of time, where we assume no
abnormal traffic conditions. After this initialization period, we generate traffic between the hosts H_4
and H_2 during a period of 30 seconds, increasing the payload of the packets each time.
The utilization of Open vSwitch has, however some limitations that should be address when the tests
are being designed. Figure 6.4 shows the increase of the packet loss as the number of flows in OVS
increases. This limitation implies that in order for the tests to run successfully, there needs to be a care
in the amount of flows that are generated.
Figure 6.4: OVS measured packet loss
6.3 Results and Evaluation
We analyse the measurements of the initial received bytes in the different ports of the switch. Figures
6.5 and 6.6 provide an insight on the initial traffic characteristics of each port, and we observe that the
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ports providing the connection between the two switches report a higher utilization in number of bytes
and packets received. This figure also gives an insight on the present trend in the data, that in order to
improve the next values’ prediction and error calculation, these trends should be removed.
Figure 6.5: Plotting the initial measurements of BRX
Figure 6.6: Plotting the initial measurements of PRX
For calculating the prediction error et , we analysed two possibilities. The first, obtained with
et = (xi(t)=xˆi(t))2; (6.3)
54
6.3 Results and Evaluation Elephant Flow Monitoring
provides the output present in figure 6.7, and while it clearly indicates the deviations created by the
elephant flows, it does not provide insight to the level of change caused by larger payloads in the flows.
Figure 6.7: Error calculation, with two different values for a , obtained with equation 6.3
The alternate approach devised was to consider the squared prediction errors, as shown in equation
6.4.
e2t = (xt   xˆt)2 (6.4)
This method allows to obtain the prediction error, while increasing the impact of larger changes to
the flow data size, and minimizing smaller changes. In figure 6.8 we can visualise the output of this
method, which displays the traffic behaviour in the ports of a switch, and the impact of larger payloads
of data is visible, as shown by the increasing level of et .
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Figure 6.8: e2 calculation using the method present in 6.4
In figure 6.7 and 6.8 , we test the error prediction behaviour for two different values of the a pa-
rameter of the prediction equations, to see the impact that the previous observations have on the error
behaviour. We consider the output of the bottom plot of 6.8 as the desired one, where we assume a = 0:8
since it clearly indicates the start and end times of the variation, which in contrast to the upper plot in this
figure, where the value a = 0:2 is used, does not present a rising trend. Due to this result, we propose
higher (a ! 1) values for the smoothing factor for posterior results, more specifically a = 0:8.
In the initial detection strategy, the error detection is based in comparing the calculated prediction
error to a certain threshold. Choosing this threshold requires previous knowledge of the magnitude of
the change, and figure 6.9 represents the output of the prediction error calculation using this method. We
assume a value of d > 2 for this detection threshold, to show that the detection threshold may be tuned
depending on the use case.
In figure 6.9 we plot the prediction error calculated for every port on the switch, including the inter-
switch connection. Since the developed algorithm monitors the changes in traffic characteristics on the
switch ports connected to a host, applying the change detection to the inter-switch connection does not
provide any useful information, as such, we do not apply the algorithms to these ports.
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Figure 6.9: Simple detection
Figure 6.10 displays the error detection using the CUSUM algorithm, and the timestamps of alarms
raised for the switch port connected to host H4. From this result, we conclude that with this algorithm we
can accurately detect the changes in traffic per port. The greatest difference to the previous mechanism
is the reduction in the number of alarms, since this algorithm does the detection across a sliding window
of observations, and the alarms are only raised when the traffic characteristics change. Regardless, the
same changes in port traffic are detected.
57
6.3 Results and Evaluation Elephant Flow Monitoring
Figure 6.10: CUSUM Detection results
Analysing the output of the algorithm after the tests finish indicates the corresponding timestamps of
the alarms. Blindly applying the sliding window technique in the algorithm will result in repeated alarms
across the window, and as we vary the length of the window, the algorithm may raise notifications even
if the change has taken place at some time in the past. A simple enhancement to the proposed algorithm
is to consider only the first occurrence of the alarms. Figure 6.11 shows the result of plotting the number
of alarms against the changing size of the window, the upper figure considering only the timestamps of
the first occurrence of the alarm, on the contrary of the lower figure.
This proposed approach also allows the comparison between the offline and the online approach to
change detection. In figure 6.1, the offline output can be analysed for the number of expected alarms
on this testing scenario. Comparing this result to the enhanced version in figure 6.11, we conclude
that the number of errors are similar to the offline version, which means that we can accurately detect
every change in the test scenario with the online algorithm. In this figure, the shaded area represents the
measured variation in the number of alarms.
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Figure 6.11: Comparison of the alarm count between enhanced and non enhanced version
Continuing the analysis of the impact caused by the variation of the window size, the analysis of a
single elephant flow (as shown in figure 6.12) allows us to evaluate the performance of the algorithm,
with the methods mentioned in section 3.2.2.5. Obtaining a baseline for the amount of raised alarms and
detection timestamps was done by applying the offline CUSUM algorithm to this test case.
Figure 6.12: Single elephant flow
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The analysis of the error detection time will provide us with the performance of this change detection
algorithm. By establishing the baseline detection times obtained from the CUSUM algorithm, using the
same threshold and drift parameters in the online and offline case, we can determine the difference be-
tween these baseline values and the values obtained online. Figure 6.13 shows the result of this analysis,
and the variation caused to the time to detection from the varying window size. To generate this result,
we have performed 30 different measures for each window size, and compare the time of detection to the
baseline value.
Figure 6.13: Analysis of the time to detect the change
Analysing the single elephant flow, and the output of the online detection algorithm also allows us
to compare the baseline amount of alarms. This will give us an insight to the amount of false alarms
generated, and the relationship of these with the window size. Table 6.1 shows us the obtained statistics
of the number of alarms, which confirms a worse accuracy for the number of alarms with the smaller
windows.
Table 6.1: False alarms statistics
Window Size 5 10 15 20 25
count 30 30 30 30 30
x¯ 2.833333 2.166667 2.0 2.0 2.0
s2 0.791478 0.379049 0.0 0.0 0.0
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In spite of the expected result of quicker detection for smaller windows [73], figure 6.13 does not
present much variation in the detection time, but the amount of false alarms raised by the smaller windows
suggest a better performance of the algorithm using larger window sizes.
Finally, an interesting consequence of applying a change detection method applied to the statistics
on the ports on the switch, is the independence of the protocol, allowing us to understand traffic changes
on the ports regardless if the transport protocol is TCP or UDP.
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7.1 Summary of Results
The main objective for this thesis was building a management system that would integrate with a pre-
existing Software-Defined Network controller, exposing information for network operators to manage
and configure their networking infrastructure. With these requirements, we have proposed a management
environment that extends a previously existing system, by adding an interface to baseboxd and CAWR,
two SDN controllers composing the Basebox environment, allowing further developments in the field
of Traffic Engineering with these systems. Integrating this system, we have designed a Graphical User
Interface for interaction with the users, allowing for simple visualisation of the network’s physical topol-
ogy, and the display of interfaces’ statistics, like the packets and bytes received and sent, or the number
of errors.
We have also proposed an algorithm that allows for monitoring traffic changes in ports, in order
to detect elephant flows in the network. Despite not having used the Basebox system for testing this
algorithm, due to differences in the testing environment, we believe that the same algorithm can be used
for large flow detection in the Basebox stack, by changing the interface for obtaining statistics. We have
shown that a simple method can be employed by operators to monitor the state of their network, and rely
on this algorithm to provide them with alarms of port changes.
7.2 Future Work
Despite our conclusion that the main objectives of the thesis were achieved, the large scope of themes
that this topic encompasses means that not everything could be successfully covered. As for more im-
mediate concerns, the next steps in guaranteeing a stable product would be the expansion of the GUI to
report and configure VLANs in each port that is monitored; and support layer 3 functionality, such as
visualising next hop neighbours, routing tables, etc. In regards to longer term goals, continuing the work
on monitoring not only the port change, but the actual flow that contributes to the largest changes in ports.
This could be expanded into a system that analyses the services and applications that contribute the most
to the traffic volumes in the network, which can then be further optimized by reporting the periodicity
62
7.2 Future Work Conclusion
of the largest traffic volumes. The aspect of providing a system that can discriminate the traffic by trans-
port protocol is also an interesting research topic for improving Quality of Service in Software-Defined
Networks.
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A.1 GUI icons mapping
Table A.1: GUI icons and their meaning
switch
host
port
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